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EARNING THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT
AFTER BERGHUIS V. THOMPKINS
Isa Chakarian†
INTRODUCTION
Even the interrogating detective conceded that the interroga-
tion of Van Chester Thompkins was “very, very one sided” and
“nearly a monologue.”1 Detective Helgert, the primary interroga-
tor, described Mr. Thompkins as “largely silent” and “not verbally
communicative” throughout the three-hour interrogation.2 Ac-
cording to Helgert’s testimony, throughout the interrogation, Mr.
Thompkins appeared “peculiar” and “sullen.”3 Mr. Thompkins re-
fused to make eye contact with the detectives and kept his head
down.4 Describing Mr. Thompkins’s response to the officers’ at-
tempts to get him to talk, Helgert admitted, “not only did it not
illicit any admissions or denials, for that matter, it did not illicit any
sort of reaction.”5
Mr. Thompkins’s interrogation took place in an “austere”
eight by ten feet room in a detention facility, during which he was
made to sit in a school-room type chair.6 Initially unsuccessful, the
two detectives who interrogated Mr. Thompkins resorted to using a
number of tactics in an effort to get him to speak. They told him,
there are “two sides to a story,” and that “[p]eople are going to
want to hear from you.”7 When these efforts failed to produce a
statement from Mr. Thompkins, Helgert made a last ditch effort.
He appealed to Mr. Thompkins’s spirituality. Helgert asked Mr.
Thompkins whether he believed in God and “if he prayed to God
to forgive him for shooting that boy down.”8 After at least two
hours and forty-five minutes of consistently exercising his right to
† J.D. 2012, CUNY School of Law. The author thanks Professor Steve Zeidman for
his invaluable guidance and support. The author is also grateful to my colleagues
Cynthia Liang and Eric Washer for their insightful comments, and gratefully acknowl-
edges the City University of New York Law Review for its administrative support.
1 Brief for Respondent, Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010) (No. 08-
1470), 2010 WL 265634, at *2 [hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
2 Brief for Respondent at *2.
3 Id. at *5.
4 Id.
5 Id. at *5–6.
6 Id. at *5.
7 Id. at *6.
8 Brief for Respondent supra note 1, at *6.
81
82 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:81
remain silent, Mr. Thompkins tearfully answered “Yes” to both
questions.9 These two one-word answers were later used as evi-
dence against Mr. Thompkins in the fatal shooting of Samuel Mor-
ris. The propriety of this interrogation was litigated all the way to
the Supreme Court.
In Berghuis v. Thompkins, the Court held that to trigger the pro-
cedural duty on police officers to “scrupulously honor” the right to
remain silent, the individual must first invoke that right clearly and
unambiguously.10 This Note describes how lower federal and state
courts are interpreting and applying the Berghuis clear statement
requirement. An additional objective is to compare the various in-
terpretations of the Berghuis clear statement requirement to deter-
mine which approach sets out the best guidelines for
distinguishing between clear and ambiguous invocations of the
right to remain silent. I attempted to reach these goals by surveying
66 federal and state cases that extensively or substantially discuss
the Berghuis decision.
Parts I and II begin with a discussion of important Supreme
Court precedents on the Fifth Amendment privilege against com-
pelled self-incrimination. In Part III, I turn to the specific issue of
invocation. There, I argue that the Berghuis Court’s failure to set
out a meaningful standard by which courts can differentiate be-
tween clear and ambiguous invocations of the right to remain si-
lent has resulted in varying interpretations of the clear statement
requirement among lower federal and state courts. Specifically, my
research revealed that lower courts’ understanding of the Berghuis
invocation standard fits into roughly three categories of
interpretation.
After comparing and contrasting the three categories of inter-
pretation in Part IV, I argue in Part V that an approach based on
the totality of the circumstances is the best way to determine
whether an individual has “unambiguously” invoked his or her
right to remain silent. An approach to the invocation inquiry which
takes into account all of the relevant facts provides a balance be-
tween the interests of the state in solving crime and the rights and
dignity of ordinary citizens that comes closer to objective fairness.
Such a standard also acknowledges the reality that the conditions
of custodial interrogation are specifically designed to undermine
the individual’s ability to exercise his or her rights. Additionally,
the totality of the circumstances test redistributes the burden of
9 Id.
10 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010).
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persuasion between the accused and the state because it accounts
for the statements, conduct, and demeanor of the interrogating
police officer in relation to the individual’s invocation. By operat-
ing in this way, the totality of the circumstances test is more consis-
tent with Miranda’s assertion that the burden of persuasion rests
with the state, “since [it] is responsible for establishing the isolated
circumstances under which the interrogation takes place . . . .”11
Unlike the totality of the circumstances test, the other two
standards discussed in this Note fail to achieve objectivity because
they ignore the affect of the custodial interrogation environment
on the individual’s ability to exercise the right to remain silent.
Furthermore, standards that fail to take into account the totality of
the circumstances are grounded in a superficial analysis because
they only provide courts with a snapshot of the interrogation,
whereas the totality standard provides courts with a richer factual
basis for deciding on the invocation question. Finally, the totality of
the circumstances standard provides the potential for greater con-
sistency across decisions dealing with the invocation inquiry, by
specifically identifying and considering contextual factors that give
a rational explanation for why one statement counts as unambigu-
ous while another does not.
I. BACKGROUND
In Miranda v. Arizona the Supreme Court aimed to set out a
broader set of protections against coerced confessions than that
provided by the voluntariness doctrine and the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendment due process standards which had preceded
it.12 The Miranda Court held that in the context of custodial inter-
rogation, statements made by an accused individual are inadmissi-
ble unless the police abide by certain procedures that operate to
protect the individual’s Fifth Amendment privilege against com-
pelled self-incrimination and the Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel.13 The underlying rationale of the Miranda procedures is to
ensure that the individual who makes a confession during custodial
interrogation does so of his or her own free will.14 Prior to Mi-
11 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
12 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432–33 (2000); Miranda, 384 U.S.
at 457 (discussing shortcomings of the totality of the circumstances test for determin-
ing the voluntariness of a confession).
13 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478–79. See also James L. Buchwalter, Construction and Appli-
cation of Constitutional Rule of Miranda – Supreme Court Cases, 17 A.L.R. FED. 2d 465
(2011).
14 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 462 (explaining that the issue of admissibility for purposes
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randa, confessions obtained during the course of custodial interro-
gation were judged against the standard of “voluntariness” and the
due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.15
The voluntariness test is grounded in the Fifth Amendment’s privi-
lege against compelled self-incrimination, and consists of examin-
ing “‘whether a defendant’s will was overborne’ by the
circumstances surrounding the individual’s confession.’”16 In ap-
plying the voluntariness test, courts take into consideration “the
totality of all the surrounding circumstances,” which includes the
characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.17
In Miranda, the Supreme Court took a markedly different ap-
proach to determining whether a confession obtained during the
course of custodial interrogation is admissible. The Court empha-
sized the effect of modern custodial interrogation tactics on the
ability of the individual to make an unfettered and voluntary
choice to speak or remain silent; the Court very clearly asserted
that custodial interrogation is an inherently compulsive process de-
signed to jeopardize the individual’s free choice to remain silent.18
According to the Miranda Court, the traditional totality of the cir-
cumstances test was ineffective in catching involuntary custodial
confessions, and in fact, posed an “unacceptably great” risk that
such confessions would escape detection.19 Miranda held that a
confession is admissible only if the police abide by certain proce-
dures that operate to dispel the inherent compulsion of custodial
interrogation and protect the individual’s right to exercise his or
of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination depends on whether the
confession is voluntary; whether a confession is involuntary depends on proof estab-
lishing that but for external forces in the context of custodial interrogation, the indi-
vidual would not have made the confession (citing Bram v. United States, 168 U.S.
532, 542 (1897)). See also Illan M. Romano, Note and Comment, Is Miranda on the
Verge of Extinction? The Supreme Court Loosens Miranda’s Grip in Favor of Law Enforcement,
35 NOVA L. REV. 525, 528 (2011) (describing the central goal of Miranda as ensuring
that the individual makes a free choice to speak to the police).
15 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
226 (1973)) (discussing the pre-Miranda law governing admission of confessions).
16 Id. at 433–34 (citing Bram, 168 U.S. at 542 and Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278, 286–87 (1936), which initially set forth the voluntariness test, and Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 486, 492 (1964) and Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225–29, which re-
fined the due process standard for admissibility of confessions).
17 Id. at 434 (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226).
18 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (“We have concluded that without proper safeguards
the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime con-
tains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will
to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.”).
19 See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608 (2004) (quoting Dickerson, 530 U.S. at
442) (describing why the Court abandoned the “totality of the circumstances” volun-
tariness inquiry in favor of the Miranda protections).
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her free will when choosing to make a statement to the police.20
The Miranda procedures are a series of bright-line rules that
establish a clear way of determining whether a particular statement
is admissible, consistent with the Fifth Amendment.21 These proce-
dural requirements were designed to diminish the coercion inher-
ent in custodial interrogation, which “blurs the line between
voluntary and involuntary statements,” and thus heightens the risk
that the privilege against self-incrimination will not be observed.22
The first and perhaps most enduring of the straightforward
Miranda procedural protections is the requirement that interrogat-
ing police officers warn the individual of his or her Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination and the Sixth
Amendment right to an attorney.23 Specifically, the warning re-
quirement established by Miranda requires the police to advise the
accused prior to interrogation of:  (1) the right to remain silent
and that any statements made by the accused can and will be used
against her in court; and (2) the right to an attorney, the right to
have the attorney present during interrogation, and the right to
have an attorney appointed if the accused is indigent.24 According
to the Miranda Court, the warning requirement serves three princi-
ple purposes. First, the warning serves to make persons who are
unaware of the privilege conscious of the right, which is a thresh-
old requirement for its intelligent exercise.25 Second, the Court
reasoned that such warnings served to assure the individual that his
or her decision to exercise these rights would be respected by the
police at any time during the course of the interrogation.26 Finally,
the Court held that the most important purpose of the warnings is
that they help overcome the inherent pressures of custodial inter-
rogation.27 Thus, if the police fail to advise the individual of his or
her Miranda rights before the interrogation, any statements made
20 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
21 Id. at 458 (“Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the inher-
ent compulsion in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant
can truly be the product of his free choice.”).
22 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 435. See also George M. Dery III, Do You Believe in Miranda?
The Supreme Court Reveals Its Doubts in Berghuis v. Thompkins by Paradoxically Ruling
that Suspects Can Only Invoke Their Right to Remain Silent by Speaking, 21 GEO. MASON U.
C.R. L.J. 407, 413 (2011) (citing to Dickerson in describing the underlying concerns
addressed by Miranda, and characterizing the rules that were established in Miranda
as “straightforward”).
23 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467–68.
24 Id. at 444–45, 479.
25 Id. at 468.
26 Id.
27 Id.
86 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:81
by the individual during the interrogation, whether inculpatory or
exculpatory, are inadmissible.28
The second important procedural rule established by Miranda
is the requirement that police obtain an affirmative waiver of rights
from the individual prior to commencing the interrogation.29 The
Court was very clear in holding that merely warning the individual
of the right to remain silent and the right to counsel is not enough
to sufficiently allay the coercive nature of police interrogation.30 In
order to effectively combat the inherent compulsion of custodial
interrogation, the police can only interrogate the individual after
he or she has expressly waived the rights protected by Miranda.31 In
effect, this second procedural requirement precludes persistent po-
lice questioning in the absence of an affirmative waiver of the
rights.32 Nine years after Miranda was decided, the Supreme Court
explicitly affirmed the ban on persistent police questioning in
Michigan v. Mosley,33 and held that a critical safeguard of the Mi-
randa procedures is the individual’s “right to cut off questioning.”34
The Mosley Court recognized unrelenting questioning to be an ele-
ment of coerciveness, which wears down the individual’s resistance
and compels him or her to speak.35
The Miranda Court went further than merely requiring the po-
lice to obtain an express waiver of rights from the individual prior
to the commencement of the interrogation. The Court established
a presumption against the finding of waiver by holding that even
28 Id. at 444–45, 476–77. See also Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608 (2004)
(“[F]ailure to give the prescribed warnings and obtain a waiver of rights before custo-
dial questioning generally requires exclusion of any statements obtained. Conversely,
giving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of
admissibility; maintaining that a statement is involuntary even though given after
warnings and voluntary waiver of rights requires unusual stamina, and litigation over
voluntariness tends to end with the finding of a waiver.”).
29 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476 (“The requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a
fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and not simply a prelimi-
nary ritual to existing methods of interrogation.”). See also Richard L. Budden, All in
All, Miranda Loses Another Brick from Its Wall: The U.S. Supreme Court Swings Its Hammer
in Berghuis v. Thompkins, Dealing a Crushing Blow to the Right to Remain Silent, 50
WASHBURN L.J. 483, 505 (2010).
30 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469–70.
31 Id. at 479. See also Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at *19 (asserting that
“Miranda requires an affirmative waiver of rights before questioning begins”); Bud-
den, supra note 29, at 505.
32 Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at *46 (citing Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S.
96, 105–06 (1975)).
33 Mosley, 423 U.S. at 105–06.
34 Id. at 103–04 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474).
35 Id. at 104.
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where the police obtain an express waiver, it is not necessarily tan-
tamount to a voluntary waiver.36 Additionally, Miranda holds that in
a motion to suppress statements that were obtained in violation of
its prescribed procedures, the prosecution bears a heavy burden in
proving that the individual knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waived his or her rights.37 Moreover, waiver can never be presumed
simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or
merely from the fact that a confession is ultimately obtained.38
Later Supreme Court decisions limited the scope of Miranda’s
express pre-interrogation waiver requirement, holding that Mi-
randa did not set up a per se rule requiring an express waiver in all
situations.39 In North Carolina v. Butler, the Court recognized an im-
plied waiver based on “the defendant’s silence, coupled with an
understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating
waiver.”40 In Butler, the Court determined that the facts were suffi-
cient to establish an implied waiver because the accused individual
verbally indicated to the police his willingness to make statements
immediately after he received Miranda warnings even though he
refused to waive his rights in writing.41
In addition to setting up a regime which requires the police to
obtain an express waiver prior to interrogation, the Miranda proce-
dures established a standard that allows the individual to assert his
or her right to remain silent through an implied invocation.42 The
Court specifically stated that if the individual “indicates in any
36 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471. See also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2269
(2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (discussing the presumption against the finding of
waiver as interpreted by the Court in North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979)).
Indeed, even the Berghuis Court acknowledged language in Miranda which indicates
that waivers are difficult to establish absent an explicit written waiver or an express
oral statement. Id. at 2260–61 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475).
37 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475. In Moran v. Burbine, the Court further established that
the individual must know “the nature of the right being abandoned and the conse-
quences of the decision to abandon it” and that the waiver must be “voluntary in the
sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation,
coercion or deception.” 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986).
38 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475; Butler, 441 U.S. at 373.
39 See Romano, supra note 14, at 538 (noting that “the language in Miranda should
not be read to require a per se rule that only an express waiver is sufficient to illustrate
a waiver”).
40 Butler, 441 U.S. at 373.
41 Id. See also Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at *18–24.
42 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444–45. See also Dery III, supra note 22, at 407, 433 (point-
ing out the extent to which Berghuis flips Miranda on its head by establishing a very
low standard for waiver, but requiring an incongruously high standard for invocation,
and arguing that the imbalance between the care demanded of lay individuals and
the informality permitted to professional police casts doubt on the Berghuis Court’s
commitment to Miranda).
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manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may
not question him.”43 Going further, the Court held that “[t]he
mere fact that [the individual] may have answered some questions
or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him
of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he
has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be
questioned.”44
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF MIRANDA
The Supreme Court in Berghuis v. Thompkins reached two con-
clusions that effectively reduced Miranda’s protections to the mere
requirement that police warn the individual of his or her right to
remain silent and right to counsel prior to commencing the inter-
rogation. In many ways the Court’s indifference toward the Mi-
randa rules comes as no surprise. Since the Supreme Court
decided Miranda, it has repeatedly distinguished Miranda violations
from actual coercion which violates the Fifth Amendment, and in-
terpreted Miranda as having announced “only prophylactic rules”
that go above and beyond the right against compelled self-incrimi-
nation.45 It is apparent that the majority in Berghuis supported
Chief Justice Robert’s position by repeatedly limiting the reach of
Miranda, stating, “[t]he main purpose of Miranda is to ensure that
an accused is advised of and understands the right to remain silent
and the right to counsel,”46 and explaining that “the primary pro-
tection afforded suspects subjected to custodial interrogation is the
Miranda warnings themselves.”47
43 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445.
44 Id. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have limited the scope of the implied
invocation standard. For example, in Michigan v. Mosley, the Court ruled that even
where an individual expresses his or her wish to remain silent, a statement made
thereafter could be admissible as a subsequent waiver of the right so long as the police
“scrupulously honor” the individual’s right to cut off questioning. Michigan v. Mosley,
423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975).
45 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 450 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Indeed, during the oral argument in Berghuis, Chief Justice Roberts repeatedly ex-
pressed his view that Miranda’s procedural requirements are not grounded in the
Constitution by drawing a distinction between the procedural requirements of Mi-
randa and the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. Tran-
script of Oral Argument at 40–42, 49–51, Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250
(2010) (No. 08-1470) [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument] (Chief Justice Rob-
erts: “I thought there was no dispute on this record that there was no voluntariness.
We are talking about a violation of the technical, important but formal, Miranda re-
quirements. This is not a case where the person says: My statements were
involuntary.”).
46 Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2261.
47 Id. at 2263 (citing Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 460 (1994)).
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In several cases decided after Miranda, the Supreme Court has
expressly stated that a violation of Miranda’s procedural rules does
not necessarily amount to a violation of the Constitution.48 For ex-
ample, in Michigan v. Tucker, the Court limited application of the
exclusionary rule to evidence recovered as a direct result of a Mi-
randa violation.49 In that case, the Court described Miranda’s proce-
dural safeguards as “not themselves rights protected by the
Constitution” but instead “measures to insure that the right against
compulsory self-incrimination was protected.”50 The Court also
went on to state that the police officer’s conduct in this case “did
not abridge [the defendant’s] constitutional privilege against com-
pulsory self-incrimination, but departed only from the prophylactic
standards later laid down by this Court in Miranda to safeguard
that privilege.”51
In Oregon v. Hass the Supreme Court permitted the admissibil-
ity of statements obtained in violation of Miranda for purposes of
impeachment at trial.52 The Court again distinguished Miranda’s
procedural requirements from the “voluntariness” standards of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by stating that, despite the Mi-
randa violation, there was no evidence or suggestion that the defen-
dant’s statements to the officers were coerced or involuntary.53
In New York v. Quarles the Court held that a “public safety ex-
ception” justified the failure of the police to give the defendant
Miranda warnings and permitted the admission of his unwarned
statements and the evidentiary fruits of that statement in the prose-
cution’s case in chief.54 As in Michigan v. Tucker, the Court distin-
guished between actual coercion and a violation of the Miranda
procedures, explaining that “[i]n this case we have before us no
claim that [the defendant’s] statements were actually compelled by
police conduct which overcame his will to resist.”55 The Court also
48 For a general discussion, see Harvey Gee, In Order to Be Silent, You Must First
Speak: The Supreme Court Extends Davis’s Clarity Requirement to the Right to Remain Silent in
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 423, 427–34 (2011).
49 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439 (1974).
50 Id. at 444.
51 Id. at 446.
52 Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 721–22 (1975) (citing Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. 222, 222–23 (1971)).
53 Id. at 722. See also Dery III, supra note 22, at 411 (describing the Court’s reason-
ing as further distinguishing Miranda from compulsory self-incrimination).
54 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984) (reasoning that “the need for
answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the
need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self
incrimination”).
55 Id. at 654.
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characterized the Miranda procedural rules merely as “practical re-
inforcement” of the Fifth Amendment.56
Also consider Oregon v. Elstad, where the Supreme Court again
declined to apply the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained as a
result of a Miranda violation. In holding that the defendant’s writ-
ten confession was admissible, the Court rejected the argument
that the failure of police to give him his Miranda warnings
amounted to a constitutional violation.57 The Court was explicit in
concluding that a Miranda violation was distinct from a violation of
the Fifth Amendment:
The Miranda exclusionary rule, however, serves the Fifth
Amendment and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amend-
ment itself. It may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth
Amendment violation. The Fifth Amendment prohibits use by
the prosecution in its case in chief only of compelled testimony.
Failure to administer Miranda warnings creates a presumption
of compulsion. Consequently, unwarned statements that are
otherwise voluntary within the meaning of the Fifth Amend-
ment must nevertheless be excluded from evidence under Mi-
randa. Thus, in the individual case, Miranda’s preventative
medicine provides a remedy even to the defendant who has suf-
fered no identifiable constitutional harm.58
The culmination of these erosions came in Dickerson v. United
States. The Court considered in Dickerson whether Congress had the
authority to supersede its decision in Miranda by passing legislation
which expressly designated voluntariness as the basis for admissibil-
ity of statements obtained during custodial investigation.59 The
Court ultimately ruled that Miranda is constitutionally based,60 but
its underlying rationale raises questions about the Court’s commit-
ment to treating the Miranda procedural protections as themselves
arising out of the Fifth Amendment. For example, the Court admit-
ted that numerous exceptions to Miranda have been recognized61
56 Id. (citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)). See also Dery III, supra
note 22, at 411 (citing additional language from Quarles where the Court distin-
guishes Miranda from the Fifth Amendment, and observing that, “[r]ather than com-
ing directly out of the Fifth Amendment, the Quarles Court characterized Miranda’s
‘procedural safeguards’ as merely ‘associated with the privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination.’”).
57 Hass, 470 U.S. 298, 305–06 (1985).
58 Id. at 306–07.
59 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 436–37 (2000).
60 See id. (discussing the rationale underlying Miranda’s constitutional basis).
61 Id. at 441 (but countering this point, the Court stated that Miranda has also
been broadly applied, which demonstrated “not that Miranda is not a constitutional
rule—but that no constitutional rule is immutable”).
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and expressed some uncertainty as to whether it would have ruled
the same way if the issue were one of first impression.62 Further-
more, in its actual discussion of Miranda as a constitutionally based
ruling, the Court seemed to limit its focus to Miranda’s warning
requirement. In explaining why the Congressional legislation at is-
sue failed to be equally as effective as Miranda in preventing co-
erced confessions, the Court’s focus was specifically limited to the
fact that the law failed to contain a warning requirement;63 the
Court made no reference to Miranda’s other important procedural
rules, such as the requirement that police obtain a waiver prior to
commencing an interrogation. Dickerson appeared to sum up all of
Miranda’s “procedure” as the requirement that police merely warn
the individual in custody of his or her rights.64
After Dickerson, the limited extent to which the Court consid-
ers Miranda as based in the Fifth Amendment is apparent in a num-
ber of decisions that have continued to cut the substance out of
Miranda’s procedural safeguards. Berghuis v. Thompkins was decided
shortly after two cases in which the Court dealt significant blows to
Miranda’s requirement that individuals must be “clearly informed”
of their rights prior to the interrogation,65 and that the police must
immediately cease interrogation when an individual invokes his or
her right to an attorney.66
In Florida v. Powell the Court concluded that the defendant was
“clearly informed” of his right to counsel even though police of-
ficers never expressly told him that an attorney could be present
with him throughout the interrogation.67 Although the police of-
ficers failed to explicitly advise Mr. Powell of a fundamental aspect
of his rights, the Supreme Court nonetheless concluded that, taken
together, the officers’ statements “reasonably conveyed” Mr. Pow-
ell’s right to have an attorney present.68 Powell is significant because
it has the effect of reducing Miranda’s requirement that individuals
be “clearly informed” of their rights to a standard that merely re-
quires the warnings to be “reasonably convey[ed].”69 Based on the
62 Id. at 443.
63 Id. at 442.
64 Id.
65 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471–72 (1966).
66 Id. at 474.
67 Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1205 (2010). The issue before the Court in
Powell was whether the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment required
suppression of the accused individual’s written confession since the police had ob-
tained an earlier statement from him without advising him of his Miranda rights.
68 Id. at 1204–05.
69 See Romano, supra note 14, at 531–32.
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reasoning of Powell, the police are capable of “reasonably convey-
ing” an individual’s rights to him even when they fail to convey a
fundamental aspect of the Miranda warnings.
The following day, in Maryland v. Shatzer, the Supreme Court
cut another important piece out of Miranda by creating an excep-
tion to the rule established in Edwards v. Arizona, which requires
police officers to immediately cease the interrogation of an individ-
ual who asserts the right to counsel.70 In Shatzer, the Court reached
three conclusions that significantly diminished the Miranda proce-
dural safeguard of the individual’s right to refuse questioning with-
out the presence of an attorney. The Court held that Mr. Shatzer
experienced a “break in custody” when he returned to the general
prison population after a 2003 interrogation that took place at the
Maryland Correctional Institute.71 The Court went even further by
asserting that a so-called “break in custody” lasting 14 days is suffi-
cient to eliminate the dangers of coercion prevented by the Mi-
randa procedural safeguards and the Edwards rule.72 These rulings
culminated in the Court’s most significant disposition: that such a
break in custody is sufficient to lift Edwards’s perpetual ban on fur-
ther police questioning of an individual who has invoked the right
to counsel,73 thereby permitting the police to go back and re-inter-
rogate an individual who has invoked his or her right to an
attorney.
70 Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010). The facts of this case established
that in August 2003 Michael Blaine Shatzer was initially interrogated at the Maryland
Correctional Institute where he was serving a prison sentence in connection with sus-
picions that he had sexually abused his son. Because Mr. Shatzer declined to speak
without an attorney present during this initial questioning, the officer stopped the
interrogation and Mr. Shatzer returned to the general prison population. Two and a
half years later the police discovered additional evidence implicating Mr. Shatzer in
the sexual abuse of his son, and a different officer returned to interrogate Mr.
Shatzer. This second interrogation took place in a prison maintenance room and
lasted for approximately half an hour. Five days later the police returned to adminis-
ter a polygraph test to Mr. Shatzer, at which time they advised him of his Miranda
rights and obtained a written waiver. Upon being informed that he failed the poly-
graph test, Mr. Shatzer began to cry and made incriminating statements. For a thor-
ough discussion of Florida v. Powell and Maryland v. Shatzer, see Kit Kinports, The
Supreme Court’s Love-Hate Relationship with Miranda, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 375
(2011).
71 130 S. Ct. at 1224–25 (discussing the difference in experience for an individual
in “Miranda custody” as opposed to an individual sentenced to a prison term as justifi-
cation for the “break in custody” rationale).
72 Id. at 1223.
73 Id. at 1222–23. See also Romano, supra note 14, at 532–33.
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III. BERGHUIS V. THOMPKINS
In Berghuis v. Thompkins the Supreme Court reached two con-
clusions, effectively overturning the most important holdings of
Miranda. First, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution may
prove waiver merely by showing that the accused eventually made
incriminating statements after having received and understood his
or her Miranda rights.74 Second, the Court held that the accused
individual must unambiguously and clearly invoke his or her right
to remain silent.75
Berghuis held that “where the prosecution shows that a Mi-
randa warning was given and that it was understood by the accused,
an accused’s uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of
the right to remain silent.”76 The Court further ruled that “as a
general proposition, the law can presume that an individual who,
with a full understanding of his or her rights, acts in a manner
inconsistent with their exercise has made a deliberate choice to
relinquish the protection those rights afford.”77 In this case, Mr.
Thompkins made statements concerning his involvement in the
suspected murder after two hours and forty-five minutes of a three-
hour interrogation.78 His statements consisted of giving two “Yes”
answers in response to detectives’ questions about whether he be-
lieved in God and prayed to God for forgiveness for shooting the
victim.79 The Supreme Court held that by giving these “Yes” an-
swers in response to the officer’s questions at the end of the three-
hour interrogation, Mr. Thompkins engaged in a “course of con-
duct indicating waiver” of his right to remain silent.80
The Court also concluded that police are not required to ob-
tain an express waiver of Miranda rights before proceeding with the
interrogation.81 It explained that in order for an accused individ-
ual’s statements to be admissible at trial, the police simply have to
give the accused understandable Miranda warnings.82 Once this
condition is established, the court can proceed to determine
whether the individual made an express or implied waiver of his or
74 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2263–64 (2010).
75 Id. at 2259–60.
76 Id. at 2262.
77 Id.
78 See Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at *1–2.
79 Id.
80 Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2263 (quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373
(1979)).
81 Id.
82 Id. at 2264.
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her rights on the basis of the whole course of questioning.83
The Berghuis Court’s waiver standard diminishes the procedu-
ral safeguards established by Miranda in several ways. Berghuis held
that the State can prove a valid waiver merely by establishing that
the police gave the individual understandable rights, and that the
individual made uncoerced statements.84 This ruling undermines a
long history of Supreme Court cases that have consistently held
that a “heavy burden” rests on the prosecution to prove a valid
waiver.85
Additionally, the Berghuis waiver standard contradicts clear Su-
preme Court precedent which prohibits the inference of waiver
from the fact that the police ultimately obtain a confession.86 Mi-
randa specifically held that waiver may not be presumed “simply
from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained.”87
By holding that inculpatory statements are now sufficient to estab-
lish an implied waiver, the Berghuis Court ignored the underlying
premise, acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Miranda and But-
ler, that custodial interrogation consists of pressures designed to
jeopardize the privilege against self-incrimination.88
Further, the Berghuis Court’s reliance on Butler for the deter-
mination that an implied waiver can be inferred from the “whole
course of questioning”89 is problematic. In Butler, the Court in-
ferred a valid waiver based on William Butler’s express willingness
to speak to the police immediately after he received Miranda warn-
ings and refused to waive his rights in writing.90 The Butler Court
did not reach its conclusion regarding implied waivers on the basis
of the “whole course of questioning.” Rather, its conclusion relied
precisely on the fact that Mr. Butler willingly began speaking to the
interrogating officers right after he was advised of his Miranda
rights at the beginning of the interrogation.91 By contrast, Mr.
Thompkins not only refused to waive his rights in writing, but he
83 Id.
84 Id. at 2261.
85 See Michael L. Vander Giessen, Berghuis v. Thompkins: The Continued Erosion of
Miranda’s Protections, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 189, 201–02 (2011); Charles Weisselberg &
Stephanos Bibas, Debate: The Right to Remain Silent, 159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 69,
72–73 (2010).
86 See Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2271 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). See also Vander Gies-
sen, supra note 85, at 201–02.
87 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
88 Weisselberg & Bibas, supra note 85, at 73–74.
89 Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2264.
90 North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373–74 (1979).
91 Id.
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also sat in silence and was uncommunicative for nearly three hours
before he made any statements.92 In ruling that Mr. Thompkins
voluntarily waived his right to remain silent so far into the interro-
gation, the Berghuis Court undermined Miranda’s admonition that
the “fact of a lengthy interrogation or incommunicado incarcera-
tion before a statement is made is strong evidence that the accused
did not validly waive his rights.”93
Finally, as Professor Weisselberg points out, the Berghuis waiver
standard is also regrettable because it has the additional effect of
shifting the burden of proof onto the individual to prove that he or
she did not waive the right to remain silent.94  As discussed above,
the Supreme Court ruled that a valid waiver may be presumed
when an individual who has a full understanding of his or her
rights “acts in a manner inconsistent with their exercise.”95 The
Court was also explicit in pointing out that Mr. Thompkins made
no contention that he did not understand his rights, suggesting
that the burden for rebutting the presumption of waiver was on
him.96 Thus, the Berghuis waiver standard not only lifts the prosecu-
tion’s “heavy burden” for proving waiver, but it also places a new
weight on the individual to rebut the presumption of waiver.
Berghuis also held that in order for the individual to validly
invoke the right to remain silent, he or she must do so unambigu-
ously and clearly.97 That is, the act of remaining silent is, by itself,
insufficient to trigger the police officer’s duty to stop questioning.
To properly invoke the right to remain silent, the accused individ-
ual must clearly and unambiguously state that he or she wishes to
remain silent, or does not want to speak to the police.98 If the ac-
cused makes an ambiguous invocation, the police are not required
to end the interrogation or even ask clarifying questions to affirma-
tively ascertain the intent of the accused with respect to exercising
his or her right to remain silent.99
The Berghuis Court’s new invocation standard is problematic
for at least three reasons. First, this standard departs from Supreme
92 Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2256–57.
93 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966). See also Transcript of Oral Argu-
ment, supra note 45, at *34–36 (attorney for Mr. Thompkins arguing that given the
length of his interrogation and facts showing his lack of willingness to talk to the
police, there is evidence of coercion precluding the finding of a valid waiver).
94 Weisselberg & Bibas, supra note 85, at 72–73.
95 Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2262.
96 Weisselberg & Bibas, supra note 85, at 72–73.
97 Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2259–60.
98 Id. at 2260.
99 Id. at 2259–60.
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Court precedent, which established specific procedures for invok-
ing the right to remain silent, and applied a particular rule to
guard against violations of that right. Second, the Berghuis Court’s
invocation standard created a legal distinction, which rests on the
dubious assumption that all people, regardless of the environment
they are in, use direct and unqualified language to convey their
intent. As a result, the new invocation standard for the Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent is disproportionately disadvanta-
geous to women, racial minorities, and the socio-economically pow-
erless, demographics who tend to communicate in indirect or
qualified speech patterns.100 Third, the Berghuis Court neglected to
set out a careful standard for invoking the right to remain silent
that could be applied to situations in which the individual affirma-
tively makes some statement that might constitute an invocation of
the right to silence, as opposed to merely remaining silent
throughout most of an interrogation.
IV. THE BERGHUIS CLEAR STATEMENT RULE IN PRACTICE FOR THE
VALID EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT
What is missing from the Court’s discussion of the invocation
standard are guidelines for situations in which the individual af-
firmatively makes some statement that may be construed as an in-
vocation of the right to remain silent. Criticism of the Berghuis
Court’s invocation standard points out that since the majority
failed to specify what is required for an invocation to meet the un-
ambiguous threshold, lower courts run the risk of rejecting “as am-
biguous an array of statements whose meaning might otherwise be
thought plain.”101 Additional criticism points out that the new invo-
cation standard is similar to the voluntariness standard, which Mi-
randa replaced, in that it is inconsistent and unworkable due to its
inherent ambiguity.102  This criticism suggests that the Supreme
Court’s new invocation standard will not achieve its purported in-
tent, which was to create a bright line rule that would help the
police recognize when a person has invoked his or her constitu-
tional right to remain silent.103
The central purpose of this paper is to understand and de-
scribe how lower federal and state courts are applying the Berghuis
100 See generally Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerless-
ness in Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259 (1993).
101 Vander Giessen, supra note 85, at 206 (quoting Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2277
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting)).
102 See Budden, supra note 29, at 503.
103 Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2260.
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clear statement requirement. An additional purpose is to compare
the varying interpretations of the clear statement requirement to
determine which approach sets out the most effective guidelines
for distinguishing between clear and ambiguous invocations of the
right to remain silent.
I attempted to answer these questions by analyzing lower fed-
eral and state court decisions applying the Berghuis invocation stan-
dard. I surveyed a total of 66 cases decided in the year since
Berghuis v. Thompkins was decided. Of these, 6 were circuit courts of
appeals cases, 37 were federal district court cases, and 23 were state
level cases. I chose to focus my survey on cases in which Berghuis v.
Thompkins is discussed in some detail.104 Of the 66 cases I surveyed,
13 included an extensive or substantial discussion of the Berghuis
invocation standard.
My survey reveals that there are at least three different inter-
pretations of the Berghuis clear statement requirement. First, in
what I call the “standard of clarity” approach, the court’s analysis
focuses solely on the words or statements made by the individual in
exercising his or her right to remain silent. Under this test, the
words a person uses to invoke the right to remain silent must meet
a certain threshold of clarity in order for the court to find an af-
firmative and unambiguous assertion of that right.105
By comparison, courts employing what I term the “standard of
reasonableness” test analyze the clarity of the asserted invocation
from the perspective of the “reasonable police officer” or the “rea-
sonable person.” Unfortunately, in the cases discussed under this
category of analysis, courts generally do not identify the factors that
help determine whether a particular invocation is affirmative and
unambiguous from the perspective of the reasonable police officer
or person.106 Without a discussion of these factors, the “standard of
reasonableness” test used by some courts operates very similarly to
104 In Westlaw, these cases are given three or four green stars to indicate their
depth of treatment of Berghuis v. Thompkins.
105 These cases include United States v. McCarthy, No. 09-2259, 2010 WL 2413024
(10th Cir. June 16, 2010); United States v. Anderson, No. 10-cr-84-JD, 2011 WL
1304218 (Dist. N.H. Apr. 6, 2011); Welch v. Harrington, No. CV 09-01041-JVS (JEM),
2010 WL 4794237 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2010); People v. Hernandez, No. B223310, 2011
WL 539448 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. Feb. 17, 2011); People v. Addi, No. C063132, 2010
WL 4160693 (Cal. Ct. App. 3d Dist. Oct. 25, 2010); State v. Saeger, 329 Wis.2d 711,
2010 WL 3155264 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2010).
106 These cases include Hurd v. Terhune, 619 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2010); Ingram v.
Varga, No. ED CV 10-00732-AHM (VBK), 2011 WL 835788 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2011);
United States v. Arballo-Villa, No. CR 09-1539-TUC-DCB(HCE), 2010 WL 3947330
(Dist. Ariz. Sept. 14, 2010); State v. Demetrius M. Diaz-Bridges, No. 08–08–1014, 2010
WL 3932392 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 21, 2010), rev’d 208 N.J. 544 (2012).
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the “standard of clarity” approach, where the only basis for the
analysis is the particular words or statements used by the individual
to assert his or her right to remain silent.
The third category of analysis here determines the invocation
question on the basis of the “totality of the circumstances.” Courts
that employ the totality of the circumstances test to determine
whether an individual has affirmatively and unambiguously in-
voked his or her right to remain silent focus their attention on the
particular interaction between the individual and interrogating of-
ficers, as well as the context of this interaction. Under this test, the
particular words or statements used by the individual to assert the
right to remain silent are only one part of the analysis. This test
also accounts for the interaction between the individual and the
police by focusing on the actions and statements of the police of-
ficers in response to the individual’s asserted invocation.107  Each
of these varying interpretations of the Berghuis invocation rule is
discussed below.
1. “Standard of Clarity” Test
Courts that employ what is here called the “standard of clarity”
test to determine whether a person has affirmatively and unam-
biguously invoked his or her right to remain silent focus their anal-
ysis exclusively on the words or statements used by the person to
assert that right. The “standard of clarity” test does not consider
the effect of the custodial interrogation environment on a person’s
choice of words when expressing his or her intent. Nor does it ac-
count for the effect of the particular interaction between the police
and individual on the person’s ability to affirmatively and unequiv-
ocally assert his or her right to remain silent. In some cases, courts
applying the “standard of clarity” test only recognize an assertion as
affirmative and unambiguous if the individual uses precise lan-
guage, and literally states that he or she wishes to remain silent, or
does not want to speak with the police.108 The overall affect of the
“standard of clarity” is that it places a heavy burden on the individ-
ual, who must use specific language in order to exercise the right
107 These cases include People v. Manzo, 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 207 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th
Dist., Jan. 31, 2011); State v. Jaureggui-Arballo, No. 36379, 2010 Ida. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 370 (Idaho Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2010).
108 In justifying this level of precision, courts cite to the language from Berghuis v.
Thompkins where the Supreme Court states that had Mr. Thompkins said he wanted to
remain silent or that he did not want to speak with the police, he would have unam-
biguously invoked his right to remain silent. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250,
2254, 2263 (2010).
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to remain silent. The “standard of clarity” test is the least objec-
tively fair invocation inquiry; it ignores the reality of varying speech
patterns and the ways in which the power imbalance inherent in
custodial interrogation affects the ability of individuals to asser-
tively invoke the right to remain silent.
For example, consider Welch v. Harrington, where the District
Court for the Central District of California decided that the state-
ment, “I want to go back to my cell,” did not constitute an unam-
biguous invocation of the right to remain silent.109 In January 2006,
Lorenzo Welch was interrogated by Long Beach Police detectives
about his involvement in the murder of a Rolling Twenties gang
member.110 During the first hour of the interrogation, detectives
questioned Mr. Welch about his residence, gang affiliation, and
criminal record.111 Following this series of questions, the detectives
switched the subject of their interrogation to Mr. Welch’s sus-
pected involvement in the murder.112 Evidence at a hearing on Mr.
Welch’s motion to suppress established that at this point Mr. Welch
told the officers that he thought he should have an attorney.113
Shortly after making this statement Mr. Welch said, “I want to go
back to my cell.”114 Detective Richard Conant testified that follow-
ing Mr. Welch’s request he waited in silence for 15 seconds to see if
Mr. Welch was going to repeat his request for an attorney or say
that he wanted to leave.115 When Mr. Welch did neither, the detec-
tives resumed questioning him.116About 15 to 20 minutes later, Mr.
Welch made statements implicating himself in the murder.117
On appeal, the defense argued that Mr. Welch’s statement, “I
want to go back to my cell,” could not be interpreted as anything
but a desire to terminate the officers’ questioning.118 The district
court disagreed, and explained that similar to Mr. Thompkins, Mr.
Welch had failed to state that he wanted to remain silent or that he
did not want to talk to the police.119 The court explained that, at
best, Mr. Welch “might” have been invoking his right to remain
silent, and stated that, “in order to invoke the right to remain si-
109 Welch, 2010 WL 4794237, at *8–10.





115 Welch, 2010 WL 4794237, at *6.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id. at *8.
119 Id.
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lent, a suspect need say only, ‘I have nothing to say.’”120
Compare People v. Addi, decided in the Court of Appeal for the
Third District of California. Amera Khalid Addi was questioned by
two police officers regarding her involvement in the shooting of a
rival gang member on December 4, 2007.121 On that day Ms. Addi
was subjected to two rounds of interrogation, each approximately
45 minutes apart.122 During the first interrogation, one of the
detectives assumed an accusatory tone and told Ms. Addi that the
police had a tape recording of her telling a fellow gang member
that she knew the location of the gun used in the shooting.123 Ms.
Addi demanded to hear the tape, and after the detective played it
for her she made statements such as:  “Can you just take me back to
my cell;” “I just wanna go. If I have to go to a cell, take me to a cell.
Cause I have nothing to say;” and “I have nothing to say.”124 The
detectives continued to question Ms. Addi after she made these
statements, and subjected her to a second round of interroga-
tion.125 During the second interrogation Ms. Addi revealed the lo-
cation of the gun used in the shooting.126
The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s conclusion that
Ms. Addi invoked her right to remain silent.127 In its analysis, the
court stated that although Ms. Addi was not required to “utter the
exact word,” “she never stated specifically that she ‘wanted to re-
main silent or that she did not want to talk with the police.’”128 The
court concluded by stating that Ms. Addi’s language and tone
failed to objectively communicate to the detectives her intent to
remain silent.129
A similar case is United States v. Newland, where the court held
that statements such as, “I wanna go back upstairs. . . . So you came
out here for no reason. I’d like to go back upstairs,” and, “Alright,
like I said . . . I’ll go back upstairs . . . You made a worthless trip,”
did not constitute unequivocal invocations of the right to remain
120 Id.
121 People v. Addi, No. C063132, 2010 WL 4160693, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. 3d Dist.
Oct. 25, 2010).
122 Id. at *3.
123 Id. at *2.
124 Id.
125 Id. at *2–3.
126 Id. at *3.
127 Addi, 2010 WL 4160693, at *4.
128 Id. at *6 (quoting Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010)).
129 Id.
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silent.130 Donald Newland was interrogated in an interview room in
the basement of the LaPorte County Jail on June 20, 2008 on
charges related to theft and gun possession.131 On that date, Mr.
Newland was interrogated three separate times.132 Only statements
made by Mr. Newland during the third interrogation were at issue
on appeal.133 The facts established that approximately six minutes
into the third interrogation, Mr. Newland responded to police
questioning by stating, “I wanna go back upstairs. . . . So you came
out here for no reason. I’d like to go back upstairs.”134 Although
the detectives persisted in questioning him, Mr. Newland made a
second statement about ten minutes later, again stating “I’ll go
back upstairs. . . . I’m done.”135
In denying the claim that Mr. Newland unambiguously in-
voked his right to remain silent, the district court explained that
requesting to go back upstairs is not the same as asking to cease
police interrogation.136 The court stated that Mr. Newland’s visible
agitation when stating that he wanted to go back upstairs and that
the officers wasted a trip to see him, could have meant that he
wanted the interrogation to end just as much as it could have been
an angry response to the officers’ questioning.137 The court con-
cluded that Mr. Newland’s statements did not constitute clear and
unambiguous assertions of his intent to remain silent, or his wish
to stop speaking with the police.138
2. The Standard of “Reasonableness”
In contrast to the “standard of clarity,” the “standard of rea-
sonableness,” which is employed by a number of courts that follow
the Berghuis invocation rule, emphasizes Miranda’s holding that the
right to remain silent may be invoked in any manner. On its face,
the “standard of reasonableness” does not appear to focus solely on
the words or statements used by the person invoking his or her
right to remain silent. In this category of analysis, courts often ref-
erence the “context” in which the asserted invocation is made
when discussing whether a person affirmatively and unambiguously
130 United States v. Newland, No. 3:09-CR-71 JD, 2010 WL 2629504, at *4 (N.D.Ind.
June 25, 2010).
131 Id. at *1.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. at *2.
135 Id.
136 Newland, 2010 WL 2629504, at *5.
137 Id.
138 Id.
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invoked his or her right to remain silent. However, a close look at
the reasoning of courts applying this standard reveals that it is de-
void of any meaningful discussion of facts that would explain how
the court is distinguishing between clear and equivocal invocations
of the right to remain silent. The overall result is that, similar to
the “standard of clarity,” it appears to depend entirely on the words
or statements made by the person invoking his or her right to si-
lence. The only difference between the “standard of clarity” and
the “standard of reasonableness” ends up being the level of preci-
sion required of the person who wishes to invoke his or her right to
remain silent. Thus, the “standard of reasonableness” is not as bur-
densome on the individual as the “standard of clarity.”
In State v. Demetrius M. Diaz-Bridges, the Superior Court of New
Jersey held that the individual’s repeated requests to speak with his
mother constituted an unambiguous invocation of his right to re-
main silent.139 On May 2, 2008, Demetrius M. Diaz-Bridges was in-
terrogated for nearly ten hours at the Raleigh Police Department
in North Carolina about his involvement in the murder of Eliza-
beth O’Brien.140 Three hours and forty-two minutes into the inter-
rogation, Mr. Diaz-Bridges requested to speak to his mother for the
first time, asking: “Can I just call my mom first?”141 Approximately
nine minutes later, Mr. Diaz-Bridges confessed to the murder. The
interrogating officers did not permit Mr. Diaz-Bridges to telephone
his mother until six hours and forty-eight minutes into the interro-
gation.142 Mr. Diaz-Bridges requested to speak to his mother at
least 15 times between his first request and when he was finally
permitted to place the call.143
On appeal, the Appellate Division held that Mr. Diaz-Bridges’s
initial request to speak to his mother did not constitute a clear and
unambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent.144 However,
the court held that Mr. Diaz-Bridges’s subsequent statements indi-
cating that he wished to speak to his mother did satisfy the clear
139 State v. Demetrius M. Diaz-Bridges, No. 08–08–1014, 2010 WL 3932392, at *14
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 21, 2010), rev’d State v. Diaz-Bridges, 208 N.J. 544
(2012).
140 Id. at *1–5.
141 Id. at *2.
142 Id. at *3.
143 Id.
144 Id. at *11. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed. Applying a totality of the
circumstances analysis, the Court held that “we do not discern in any of the defen-
dant’s requests to speak with his mother an invocation of the right to silence.” Diaz-
Bridges, 208 N.J. at 570.
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statement requirement for the right to remain silent.145 The court
justified its decision by reference to Miranda’s holding that, even
after an interrogation has commenced, an individual may invoke
his or her right to remain silent in any manner during the interro-
gation.146 The court emphasized that the right to silence does not
need to be expressed with the utmost legal precision.147
It is not clear from the court’s analysis why Mr. Diaz-Bridges’s
initial requests to call his mother failed to constitute an affirmative
and unambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent, but his
later statements did. The only explanation provided by the court
on this point is that Mr. Diaz-Bridges made several statements sub-
sequent to his first request to call his mother, which the detectives
could have reasonably construed as an indication that he wanted to
remain silent.148 The court points to the fact that approximately six
hours and forty five minutes into the interrogation, when the
detectives asked Mr. Diaz-Bridges if he wanted to talk to his
mother, he stated, “I want to hear her say it’s gonna be okay. . . . I
don’t have nobody. I have nobody. And this thing is gonna do
nothing but make it worse. I just want to hear her say it’s gonna be
all right, that’s it.”149 Shortly after he made this statement, Mr.
Diaz-Bridges told the detectives, “I can’t do this shit, man. I just
want to go home.”150 According to the court, “upon making that
emphatic statement” it was satisfied that Mr. Diaz-Bridges invoked
his right to remain silent.151
The overall affect of the court’s failure to identify and discuss
the specific factors that distinguish Mr. Diaz-Bridges’s later state-
ments from his earlier requests to speak to his mother is that its
analysis rests solely on the particular words Mr. Diaz-Bridges used
to invoke his right to remain silent. Indeed, the court’s conclusion
in this case that Mr. Diaz-Bridge’s later statements constituted an
affirmative and unambiguous invocation of the right to remain si-
lent turned on the fact that these later statements were “emphatic”
as compared to his initial statements.152 Thus, the court’s refer-
ences to “context” and “reasonableness” have little meaning. The
court provides no discussion of the factors surrounding the interro-
145 Diaz-Bridges, 2010 WL 3932392, at *14.
146 Id. at *10.
147 Id.
148 Id. at *14.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Diaz-Bridges, 2010 WL 3932392, at *14.
152 See id. at *14.
104 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:81
gation context and the interaction between the police and Mr.
Diaz-Bridges that would explain the difference between his initial
requests to call his mother and his later statements. Thus, the only
difference between the standard applied by the Diaz-Bridges court
and the “standard of clarity” is that in Diaz-Bridges the court was
willing to accept an explanatory invocation of the right to remain
silent. Unlike the “standard of clarity,” the “standard of reasonable-
ness” as it was applied in Diaz-Bridges does not burden individuals
with the requirement that they use precise words or language to
invoke the right to remain silent.153
Furthermore, the court’s final determination that Mr. Diaz-
Bridges’s later statements constituted affirmative and clear invoca-
tions of the right to remain silent rest entirely on a subjective analy-
sis. The court’s only substantive explanation for accepting Mr.
Diaz-Bridges’s later statements as unambiguous invocations is that
they were “emphatic” as compared to his initial requests to speak to
his mother.154 The court otherwise neglects to identify and discuss
the specific factors that distinguish Mr. Diaz-Bridges’s affirmative
and clear invocation from his initial statements. Indeed, there is no
indication in the court’s reasoning why only some of at least 15
requests made by Mr. Diaz-Bridges to speak to his mother over the
course of the ten-hour interrogation counted as “emphatic.” In
other words, in reaching its conclusion the court may have per-
ceived his repeated requests as being more urgent the longer the
interrogation proceeded. Notwithstanding this possibility, the
problem in the court’s analysis remains that it never identifies
these or any other facts to support its final determination.
Also consider Ingram v. Varga, where the district court held
that the statement, “You know I can’t go there man. I don’t want to
incriminate myself,” constituted an unambiguous and clear invoca-
tion of the right to remain silent.155 In this case, the facts estab-
lished that Tyrone Ingram was arrested after a routine traffic stop
revealed that Mr. Ingram’s girlfriend was in the backseat of his car
and had suffered serious physical injuries to her face and body.156
At the time of Mr. Ingram’s arrest, Deputy Trevor Montgomery
read him his Miranda rights and asked Mr. Ingram if he wished to
waive his rights and speak with the deputies.157 Upon Mr. Ingram’s
153 See id. at *10.
154 See id. at *14.
155 Ingram v. Varga, No. ED CV 10-00732-AHM (VBK), 2011 WL 835788, at *4
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2011).
156 Id. at *3–6.
157 Id. at *4.
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agreement to speak, Deputy Montgomery asked what happened to
the victim’s teeth.158 In response, Mr. Ingram stated, “You know I
can’t go there, man. I don’t want to incriminate myself.”159
The federal district court stated that the California Court of
Appeals erred when it concluded that Mr. Ingram’s statement con-
stituted an equivocal and unclear invocation of his right to remain
silent.160 In its analysis, the court reasoned that under Miranda, an
individual may indicate that he or she wishes to remain silent “in
any manner” and that in invoking a constitutional right, “a suspect
need not speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don.”161 The
court concluded that any reasonable person would understand the
statement, “I don’t want to go there, man” as meaning that the
accused did not want to answer the officer’s questions, and that the
statement, “I don’t want to incriminate myself” was a clear refer-
ence to the right not to incriminate oneself under the Fifth
Amendment.162 In a footnote, the court suggests that Officer Mont-
gomery’s act of discontinuing his questions regarding the victim’s
teeth immediately after Mr. Ingram made the statements at issue
tended to indicate that he subjectively understood Mr. Ingram to
mean that he wished to invoke his right to remain silent.163
Similar to the court in Diaz-Bridges, the Ingram v. Varga court
appears to interpret the invocation rule broadly, accepting an ex-
planatory refusal to answer further police questioning as an affirm-
ative and unequivocal invocation of the right to remain silent.164
However, the court’s reasoning is similarly lacking in references to
contextual factors of the interrogation or facts related to the inter-
action between the individual and the police, which would explain
the basis for the court’s conclusion that Mr. Ingram affirmatively
and unambiguously invoked his right to remain silent. The effect
of the court’s failure to ground its determination in such facts is
that its analysis appears to rely primarily on the language of Mr.
Ingram’s refusals to further police questioning. The court’s refer-
ence to the conduct of the interrogating officer, which suggested
that he understood Mr. Ingram’s refusals to be clear invocations of
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id. at *19. Although the district court found that defendant’s Miranda rights
were violated, his conviction was sustained under the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Varga, 2011 WL 835788, at *20.
161 Id. at *19 (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994)).
162 Id. at *19 n.7.
163 Id. at *19.
164 See id.
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the right to silence is important, but it is only discussed parentheti-
cally, and clearly does not form the central focus of the court’s
conclusion.165
In contrast, in State v. Saeger, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
used a similar analysis but reached the opposite result. Phillip Sae-
ger was interrogated by two detectives in the South Beloit police
department about his role in several burglaries that occurred in
surrounding counties.166 At some point during the interview the
detectives learned that Mr. Saeger was fearful of receiving federal
gun charges.167 After learning that a gun stolen during one of the
burglaries was found at Mr. Saeger’s girlfriend’s house, the detec-
tives told Mr. Saeger that he could be charged under federal law
and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison.168 At the hearing on
his motion to suppress the statements, Mr. Saeger testified that
upon receiving this news he became angry and scared, and stated,
“You . . . ain’t listening to what I’m telling you. You don’t want to
hear what I’m saying. You want me to admit to something I didn’t
. . . do . . . and I got nothing more to say to you. I’m done. This is
over.”169 Immediately after he made these statements, the detec-
tives engaged Mr. Saeger in negotiations and eventually told him
they would not bring federal charges against him or his
girlfriend.170
In response to Mr. Saeger’s challenge, the Court of Appeals
cited to an earlier ruling in which it held that although an individ-
ual could invoke the right to remain silent without using any
words, he or she must make it sufficiently clear that the intention is
to cut off questioning so that a reasonable police officer in the cir-
cumstances would understand the statement to be an invocation of
the right to remain silent.171 The court then held that it was rea-
sonable for the police officers to conclude that Mr. Saeger’s state-
ment, when taken in context, was merely a “fencing mechanism” to
get a deal that would free him of exposure to federal charges.172
The court acknowledged that while a reasonable person could also
interpret Mr. Saeger’s statement to mean that he actually wanted
165 See id. at *19 n.7
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to invoke his right to remain silent, it interpreted the existence of a
competing inference against Mr. Saeger. Indeed, the court con-
cluded that because an alternative inference could be drawn from
the statements, it was equivocal as a matter of law.173
The court’s reasoning in Saeger demonstrates that one of the
biggest problems with the “standard of reasonableness” is that it
tends to operate subjectively. In its analysis, the court neglects to
identify or discuss any specific factors that distinguish an affirma-
tive and clear invocation of the right to remain silent, and it admits
that a reasonable person could interpret Mr. Saeger’s statements to
be an invocation of his right to remain silent. Without citing to any
specific factors in the interrogation itself, nor in the interaction
between Mr. Saeger and the interrogators, the court ultimately
concludes that Mr. Saeger’s statements constituted a “fencing
mechanism,” and then goes on to interpret the possibility of this
fact against him.174
3. “Totality of the Circumstances”
In the third category of analysis described here, courts employ
a “totality of the circumstances” test, which focuses on the context
of the custodial interrogation, and specifically, factors that describe
the interaction between the individual and interrogating officer.
To be sure, the “totality of circumstances” test focuses on the plain
meaning of the words used by the individual to invoke his or her
right to remain silent; however, the analysis does not end there.
Rather, under this “totality of the circumstances” test courts in-
quire into factors such as the individual’s conduct, the content of
the interrogation, the demeanor and tone of the interrogating of-
ficer, the officer’s response to the individual’s ambiguous invoca-
tion, the point at which the individual invoked the right to remain
silent, and the questions that elicited the invocation. The overall
effect of the “totality of the circumstances” test is that it lifts the
heavy burden of the Berghuis clear statement requirement off the
individual. Additionally, the “totality of the circumstances” test pro-
vides a more objective and consistent approach to distinguishing
between affirmative and unambiguous invocations of the right to
remain silent.
For example, in Hurd v. Terhune, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a person’s refusal to submit to a polygraph test
and reenact the shooting of his wife constituted an unambiguous
173 Id.
174 See id.
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invocation of the right to remain silent.175 Dale R. Hurd was taken
into police custody after fatally shooting his wife.176 Mr. Hurd ini-
tially agreed to cooperate with the police and speak without an at-
torney present.177 However, after Mr. Hurd told the police officers
his version of the events leading up to the shooting, the interrogat-
ing detective asked Mr. Hurd to submit to a polygraph examina-
tion.178 The court’s opinion states that Mr. Hurd refused the
detective’s request to conduct the reenactment.179 It also explains
that the detective then asked Mr. Hurd to demonstrate how he
shot his wife.180 Mr. Hurd refused this demand as well, using state-
ments such as, “No,” “I can’t,” and “I don’t want to act it out be-
cause that—it’s not that clear.”181 Nevertheless, the detectives
continued to pressure Mr. Hurd to submit to a polygraph test and
reenact the shooting of his wife.182 The court notes that in re-
sponse to Mr. Hurd’s refusals, the detectives told Mr. Hurd that he
would go to jail for being uncooperative; that the District Attorney
would not appreciate Mr. Hurd’s refusals; and that a judge and jury
would find his lack of cooperation unreasonable.183
In his appeal, Mr. Hurd argued that his repeated refusals to
submit to a polygraph test or reenact the shooting of his wife were
consistent with an unequivocal assertion of his right to remain si-
lent.184 The Court of Appeals rejected the trial court’s explanation
that Mr. Hurd did not invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege on
the ground that he offered responses and explanations instead of
flat refusals.185 After citing to the Berghuis clear statement rule, the
court stated, “a suspect still need not utter a ‘talismanic phrase’ to
invoke the right to silence.”186 Focusing on Mr. Hurd’s conduct—
in addition to his words—the court held that his responses were
objectively unambiguous in context, because he repeatedly refused
to perform the demonstration of his wife’s shooting.187 Signifi-
cantly, in reaching its conclusion, the court also relied on com-
175 Hurd v. Terhune, 619 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 2010).
176 Id. at 1082–83.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 1083–84.
179 Id. at 1084.
180 Id.
181 Terhune, 619 F.3d at 1089.
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ments by the interrogating officers.188 The court does not provide
the officers’ specific statements in its opinion; however, it is signifi-
cant that the court focused on the officers’ comments, and found
them important to the overall analysis, precisely because they
demonstrated that the officers subjectively understood Mr. Hurd’s
responses to be unambiguous invocations.189
Similarly, in People v. Manzo, the Court of Appeal for the
Fourth District in California held that the circumstances of the
case and the context of the words used by the officers and the indi-
vidual established that Martin Manzo unequivocally invoked his
right to remain silent.190 Mr. Manzo was questioned by police re-
garding his involvement in the fatal shooting of José Valdez.191 The
video recording and written transcript of Mr. Manzo’s interroga-
tion established that shortly after the police officers began to advise
him of his Miranda rights, one of the officers told Mr. Manzo that
he wanted to give him an opportunity to tell his version of the
events leading up to the shooting.192 Mr. Manzo replied, “Oh, hell
no. Don’t even. . . . Don’t even mention it.”193 Before the interro-
gating officer could even finish reading him his Miranda rights, Mr.
Manzo interrupted the officer and made statements such as, “I’m
doing what my right” and “I’m doing my right.”194
The reviewing court concluded that Mr. Manzo unambigu-
ously invoked his right to remain silent.195 In its reasoning the
court cited to Berghuis v. Thompkins, and characterized the Su-
preme Court’s holding as stating that under the new invocation
standard, “suspects may invoke the right to remain silent only by an
unambiguous statement to that effect.”196 However, the court then
emphasized Miranda, stating that the interrogation must cease
when the individual indicates “in any manner” that he wishes to
remain silent.197 The court underscored this point by stating that
no particular form of words or conduct is necessary to invoke the
188 See id. at 1089 (noting that “the interrogating officer’s comment show that they
subjectively understand Hurd’s responses as unambiguous refusals”).
189 Id.
190 People v. Manzo, 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 207, 218 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist., Jan. 31,
2011).
191 Id. at 214–18.
192 Id. at 217.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 218.
195 Id. at 216.
196 Manzo, 121 Cal.Rptr.3d at 219 (citing Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2260) (emphasis
added).
197 Id.
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right to remain silent; individuals are not required to use specific
words such as “invoke” or “assert” to unambiguously invoke the
right to remain silent; and that an individual’s assertion of the
right to remain silent cannot be conditioned on the use of certain
technical words or other similar formalities.198
The court also included a substantial description of the factual
basis for its determination. In addition to considering the sub-
stance of Mr. Manzo’s statements, the court analyzed whether his
conduct inferentially established that he wished to exercise his
right to remain silent.199 For example, the court found it signifi-
cant that after the police officers finished advising Mr. Manzo of
his Miranda rights and asked him whether he understood each
right, Mr. Manzo remained silent for approximately eight seconds
instead of responding immediately.200 Further, the court attached
great weight to the fact that in response to the officers’ second
inquiry as to whether he understood his Miranda rights, instead of
answering that particular question, Mr. Manzo stated he was “doing
what my right.”201 The court explained that Mr. Manzo confirmed
his invocation when, after further questioning about whether he
understood his rights, he emphatically stated, “I’m doing my
right.”202
The Court of Appeals of Idaho considered similar and addi-
tional factors in State v. Jaureggui-Arballo, where it reversed the trial
court’s denial of the defense’s motion to suppress, holding that a
reasonable police officer in the circumstances would have under-
stood the statements at issue as unambiguous and unequivocal in-
vocations of the right to remain silent.203 The facts of Mr.
Jaureggui-Arballo’s interrogation established that on several occa-
sions throughout the questioning, he told the interrogating police
officer that he did not wish to continue answering questions, mak-
ing statements such as: “Like I said, I am not talking anymore,” and
“I’m not going to talk about anything with you. I told you al-
ready!”204 Additionally, Mr. Jaureggui-Arballo made statements in-
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a later time.205
In its analysis of the invocation issue, the court looked beyond
the language of Mr. Jaureggui-Arballo’s statements, and consid-
ered ten specific contextual factors as the basis for determining
whether Mr. Jaureggui-Arballo’s statement constituted an unequiv-
ocal invocation of the right to remain silent. These factors in-
cluded:  (1) the plain meaning of the individual’s words; (2) the
officer’s response to these words; (3) the individual’s speech pat-
terns; (4) the content of the interrogation; (5) the demeanor and
tone of the interrogating officer; (6) the individual’s conduct dur-
ing the questioning; (7) the point at which the individual invoked
the right to remain silent; (8) the questions which drew the invoca-
tion; (9) the officer’s response; and (10) who was present during
the questioning.206
In this case, the court attached significance to the statements
and conduct of the interrogating officer in response to Mr. Jaureg-
gui-Arballo’s statements. For example, the court focused on the
fact that after Mr. Jaureggui-Arballo stated, “I’m not going to talk
about anything with you. I told you already!” the interrogating of-
ficer reacted by leaving the room for approximately four minutes,
and upon his return, he began asking Mr. Jaureggui-Arballo a se-
ries of innocuous questions for the purpose of filling out
paperwork related to the charges against him.207 The court ex-
plained that the officer’s act of leaving the interrogation room af-
ter Mr. Jaureggui-Arballo told the officer he was not going to talk
about anything indicated that the officer understood Mr. Jaureg-
gui-Arballo’s statement to be a request to stop the interrogation.208
The court further explained that the officer’s subsequent action of
asking Mr. Jaureggui-Arballo a series of innocuous questions also
indicated that the officer was complying with Mr. Jaureggui-
Arballo’s repeated requests to stop the interrogation.209
In addition to these factors, the Idaho Court of Appeals noted
that Mr. Jaureggui-Arballo’s responses came after a change in the
officer’s demeanor and the tone of the interrogation, where he be-
gan to make accusations against Mr. Jaureggui-Arballo as opposed
to merely questioning him.210 The court also emphasized that the
officer’s own statements established that he subjectively under-
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id. at *15.
208 Id. at *13.
209 Jaureggui-Arballo, 2010 Ida. App. Unpub. LEXIS 370, at *14.
210 Id. at *15.
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stood Mr. Jaureggui-Arballo’s statements to mean that did not want
to talk to the officer.211
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Courts deciding whether an accused individual affirmatively
and unambiguously has invoked the right to remain silent should
apply the totality of the circumstances test.212 This analysis provides
a fair and objective balance between the interests of the state in
solving crime and the rights and dignity of ordinary citizens. By
focusing on the factors underlying the interaction between the in-
dividual and interrogating police officers, the totality of the cir-
cumstances test takes pressure off the individual to use precise
words in order to sufficiently invoke his or her right to remain si-
lent. Unlike the standard of clarity, the totality of circumstances
test gives weight to many important factors, such as the conduct of
the individual, the individual’s speech patterns, the officer’s re-
sponses to the individual’s statements, and the content and tone of
the interrogation.
Furthermore, by taking some weight off the plain meaning of
the individual’s words, the totality of the circumstances rule recog-
nizes the existence of varying speech patterns, and is thus fairer to
particular vulnerable groups in society, such as women, racial mi-
norities, limited English-proficient persons, and the socio-economi-
cally powerless. The Berghuis invocation rule is regrettable because
of its likely disproportionate impact on individuals and groups who
communicate using indirect or qualified speech patterns. Studies
on this point show that characteristics such as gender, race, and
socio-economic status correlate with the use of different manners
of speaking adopted by specific communities under certain circum-
211 Id. at *13.
212 The “totality of the circumstances” approach has often been adopted by the
Supreme Court where the factual context is crucial and the relative importance of any
one particular factor in resolving the question before the Court depends on the spe-
cific facts of the case. As the Court noted in Illinois v. Gates, “the evidence . . . collected
must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as under-
stood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.” 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983)
(quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981). See, e.g., Stansbury v. Cali-
fornia, 511 U.S. 318 (1994) and Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1983) (whether a
person is in custody for purposes of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination); Gates, 462 U.S. at 235 (what is the quantum of proof that constitutes
probable cause); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (when does police
conduct invalidate a person’s consent to search); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972)
(when is a police-arranged identification procedure reliable despite it being
suggestive).
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stances.213 In her research, Professor Ainsworth has found that a
characteristic manner of speaking, which can be described as an
indirect and tentative style of speech, correlates with distinct seg-
ments of the population, such as women, racial minorities, and the
socio-economically powerless.214 By creating a legal distinction
which focuses on particular words and only recognizes affirmative
and direct expressions of the right to remain silent, the Supreme
Court’s new invocation rule operates to disadvantage women, ra-
cial minorities, and the poor, because of their manner of speaking.
The new invocation standard also has a negative effect on
criminal defendants because it neglects to consider the context of
custodial interrogation and the power dynamic inherent in this in-
teraction. Professor Ainsworth found that the adoption of an indi-
rect and qualified style of speech, whether conscious or
unconscious, is a response by the speaker to contextual powerless-
ness.215 Thus, taking into consideration the context of the interac-
tion between the speaker and listener, including the power
relations inherent in the situation, is necessary to understanding
how people speak and what they mean.216 Research suggests that
equivocation is the result of circumstances or contexts in which
speakers find themselves, where direct and assertive statements are
perceived as leading to negative consequences for the speaker.217
As Professor Ainsworth and others suggest, powerless people, who
most often perceive themselves as being in defensive situations, are
more likely to adopt equivocal speech patterns under such circum-
stances.218 The Berghuis invocation rule focuses almost entirely on
the words used by the person being interrogated, and it fails to
take into account the nature of the interaction between the indi-
vidual and interrogating officers. Thus, it not only fails to accom-
modate varying patterns of language used among all arrestees, but
it also fails to account for the power imbalance in the communica-
tive relationship between the individual and interrogator.
The totality of the circumstances rule assuages the dispropor-
213 Ainsworth, supra note 100, at 273, 286–87.
214 Id. at 286–87.
215 Id. at 284–85.
216 Id. at 289–92.
217 Id. at 284. See also Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV.
1519, 1537–38 (2008) (explaining that suspects are in a position of powerlessness in
the stationhouse; to avoid offending those in power and for other reasons, suspects
may articulate their intent in tentative ways, which will not be recognized as invoca-
tions under a standard that only recognizes “unambiguous” assertions of the right to
remain silent).
218 Ainsworth, supra note 100, at 284–85.
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tionate impact of the Berghuis invocation rule in two ways. Because
the totality of the circumstances test focuses on factors such as the
officer’s responses to the individual’s words, the content of the in-
terrogation, demeanor and tone of the interrogating officer, and
the officer’s responses to the individual’s invocation, it takes some
pressure off the individual to use precise language in order to meet
the “unambiguous” threshold. Second, in giving weight to the de-
meanor, tone, questions, responses and conduct of interrogating
police officers, the totality of the circumstances test accounts for
the fact that the power relations inherent to custodial interroga-
tion affect the way individuals speak and express their intent. Un-
like the other standards discussed here, the totality of the
circumstances rule accounts for the fact that through their words
and conduct police officers create the coercive conditions of custo-
dial interrogation, and recognizes that individuals will adopt an
equivocal and qualified style of speech in response to the conduct
and responses of the interrogating officers. Thus, the rule accounts
for contextual powerlessness in the invocation calculus in a way
that none of the other standards do.
Additionally, courts should adopt the totality of the circum-
stances analysis because it provides a substantial degree of consis-
tency and flexibility in the decision-making process. On one hand,
the totality of circumstances rule provides guidance and constraint
because it requires courts to consider and discuss a number of spe-
cific factors related to the interaction between the individual and
police officers during custodial interrogation. Thus, unlike the
“standard of reasonableness,” which operates subjectively due to
the lack of any apparent constraints on its decision-making process,
the “totality of the circumstances” test provides a substantial
amount of guidance because its analysis is framed by specific facts
related to the interaction between the individual and interrogators.
Through the “totality of the circumstances” test courts can draw
clear distinctions between affirmative and unambiguous invoca-
tions on a case-by-case basis. On the other hand, the rule also pro-
vides courts with the flexibility to weigh and balance the various
factors underlying the communicative relationship between the in-
dividual and interrogator.
In setting out the new standard for valid invocations of the
right to remain silent, the Berghuis Court neglected to provide any
guidelines as to the application of the standard to situations involv-
ing an individual who makes an affirmative statement that may or
may not be construed as an invocation of the right to remain silent.
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This failure resulted in the lower courts issuing decisions based on
inconsistent and varying interpretations of the Berghuis invocation
standard.
In my attempt to evaluate and classify the different interpreta-
tions of the Berghuis invocation standard among lower courts, I dis-
covered cases that fit roughly into three different categories of
interpretation:  (1) “standard of clarity,” (2) “standard of reasona-
bleness,” and (3) the “totality of circumstances” test. Based on my
analysis of these three categories, I recommend that courts adopt
the “totality of the circumstances” test to determining whether an
individual has affirmatively and unambiguously invoked the right
to remain silent because it is the least burdensome on criminal de-
fendants. It also provides courts with substantial guidance and pre-
dictability in the decision-making process. Thus, the “totality of the
circumstances” test provides a fair and objective balance between
the interests of the state in solving crime and the rights and dignity
of ordinary citizens.

